- Somatic marker hypothesis
- William James's core claim that emotions are the conscious perception of bodily changes — we do not tremble because we are afraid; we feel afraid because we notice that we are trembling. The body's physiological state is the emotion, not its accompaniment.
- Thalamic theory
- Cannon and Bard's proposal that the thalamus simultaneously triggers both the subjective emotional experience and the peripheral bodily response — the two run in parallel, neither causing the other. Directly challenged James-Lange's body-first sequence.
- Two-factor theory
- Schachter and Singer's model: emotion = physiological arousal + a cognitive label drawn from context. The same undifferentiated arousal can become euphoria, anger, or fear depending on how the situation is interpreted. Demonstrated in the 1962 adrenaline injection study.
- Primary appraisal
- In Lazarus's model: the evaluation of whether a situation is relevant to one's goals and wellbeing, and whether it is threatening, harmful, challenging, or beneficial. Determines whether an emotion is triggered at all.
- Secondary appraisal
- In Lazarus's model: the evaluation of what coping resources and options are available. Influences the type and intensity of emotion — the same threat appraised with high coping potential may produce challenge rather than anxiety.
- Affective primacy
- The proposal that affective (emotional) reactions can precede and occur independently of deliberate cognitive appraisal. Supported by the mere exposure effect and subliminal conditioning studies. Central to the Lazarus-Zajonc debate on whether cognition is necessary for emotion.
- Theory of constructed emotion
- Barrett's account: the brain does not detect pre-formed emotions from fixed circuits. It actively constructs emotional episodes by combining interoceptive signals (pleasantness/unpleasantness + arousal) with culturally learned emotion concepts. Emotions are variable and culturally shaped, not universal and biologically fixed.
- Core affect (Russell)
- A neurophysiological state, consciously accessible as a simple feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness combined with varying levels of arousal. Proposed by James Russell as a dimensional substrate underlying all emotional experience — the raw material from which emotions are constructed.
- Physiological specificity
- The question of whether different emotions have distinct, reliable physiological fingerprints in the body and brain. James-Lange requires specificity; Schachter-Singer denies it; Barrett's meta-analytic evidence argues against reliable fingerprints for discrete emotions.